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Abstract
A growing literature has begun to use overnight indexed swap (OIS) rates to measure
market expectations of future short-term interest rates. In this paper, I assess the empirical
success of OIS rates in predicting the future path of monetary policy. I first compare US OIS
rates to federal funds futures (FFFs), which have regularly been used to construct financial
market-based measures of interest rate expectations. For the 2002-2016 period, I find that
1 to 11-month OIS rates provide measures of investors’ interest rate expectations that are
as good as those from comparable-horizon FFFs contracts. More generally, I find that,
on average, 1 to 24-month US, UK, Eurozone and Japanese OIS rates accurately measure
expectations of future short-term interest rates. To date, many methods used by monetary
economists rely on FFFs data to measure monetary policy expectations. This has limited
the application of these methods to US data only. Motivated by the results in this paper,
researchers can look to OIS rates as a globally-comparable measure of monetary policy
expectations that enables them to apply these methods to a wider set of countries.
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1 Introduction
Researchers, policymakers and financial market participants closely monitor the evolution of
expectations about the future path of monetary policy. This has been particularly apparent
in recent years, as central banks have considered raising policy rates from their effective lower
bound (ELB) (Lao and Mirza, 2015). Because of the keen interest in monetary policy expecta-
tions, empirical measures of investors’ expectations of future short-term interest rates are highly
sought-after. Within the academic literature, such measures have formed an important part
of the empirical toolkit for monetary economists, informing numerous methodological contri-
butions (e.g. Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson, 2005a,b; Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Cesa-Bianchi,
Thwaites, and Vicondoa, 2016).
Broadly speaking, empirical measures of investors’ expectations of future short-term interest
rates can be categorised into three groups:1 (i) financial market-based, where interest rate
expectations are extracted from raw financial market data, such as futures and swaps; (ii)
model-based, where interest rate expectations are estimated within models that use financial
market data as an input, such as dynamic term structure models;2 and (iii) survey-based, for
instance from surveys of professional forecasters.
Financial market-based measures are the primary focus of this paper. To date, the princi-
pal measures amongst these are federal funds futures (FFFs) rates. In a widely cited paper,
Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2007) compare the empirical success of a number of US finan-
cial market-based measures — including FFFs and eurodollar futures — as predictors of the
future monetary policy stance. They conclude that, out to a 6-month horizon, FFFs dominate
all other financial market instruments in forecasting monetary policy and, at longer horizons,
the predictive power of many instruments is similar. However, Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2007) do not
compare FFFs to overnight indexed swap (OIS) rates.
FFFs have played an important role in forging an empirical toolkit for monetary economists,
enabling the study of monetary policy and its effects. However, FFFs are US-only financial
instruments and very few similar instruments are traded elsewhere. Therefore, the majority
of questions to which this empirical toolkit has been applied have focused almost exclusively
on the US. For example, work by Kuttner (2001) and Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005a) has assessed
the effect of US monetary policy shocks on investors’ interest rate expectations, as measured
by FFFs rates. Similarly, FFFs have been used to analyse the effects of US ‘unconventional’
monetary policies, such as large-scale asset purchases and forward guidance, on financial markets
(Swanson, 2016).3
Financial market-based measures of interest rate expectations offer certain advantages over
model and survey-based measures for these applications. Most importantly, financial market
1These three categories are not mutually exclusive. See Lloyd (2017a) for a proposal that incorporates both
financial market and model-based measures to estimate investors’ interest rate expectations at horizons up to 10
years, and Kim and Orphanides (2012) for a proposal that combines model and survey-based measures.
2See Lloyd (2017a) and the references within.
3Notwithstanding this, model-based estimates of investors’ interest rate expectations have been widely used to
assess the transmission channels of unconventional monetary policies (e.g. Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack,
2011; Lloyd, 2017b).
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data is available at intraday frequencies. In comparison, model-based measures are most-widely
available at monthly or daily frequencies, while survey-based measures are (at best) available at
monthly frequencies. The availability of intraday data has been critical in the aforementioned
literature, permitting the identification of exogenous shocks to monetary policy uninfluenced
by other economic news. Moreover, financial market-based instruments circumvent potentially
contentious modelling assumptions applied to model-based measures, and the limitations of
sampling from a population of individuals to create survey measures of interest rate expectations.
Most recently, a burgeoning literature, motivated by Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens
and Ravn (2013), has combined high-frequency identification techniques with structural vec-
tor autoregression methods to estimate the macroeconomic effects of monetary policy shocks.
Gertler and Karadi (2015) use surprise movements in FFFs rates during 30-minute windows
around monetary policy announcements from Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005a) as exogenous instru-
ments to structurally identify monetary policy shocks. With this literature in its infancy, the
application of financial market-based measures of interest rate expectations in academic research
is set to grow. Moreover, with the growth of a parallel literature assessing the international
transmission of monetary policy (Rey, 2016), there is a need to find financial market measures
of interest rate expectations that are available outside the US and are globally comparable.
In this paper, I propose and test the use of OIS rates for this purpose. Since their inception
in the early 2000s, OIS contracts have grown in popularity within financial markets. An OIS
contract is an over-the-counter traded derivative in which two counterparties exchange fixed
and floating interest rate payments. The floating interest rate on OIS contracts is the overnight
interbank rate, which provides a measure of the de facto monetary policy stance.4
OIS contracts have numerous features that make them excellent candidate measures of
investors’ interest rate expectations. First, there is no exchange of principal, minimising coun-
terparty risk. Second, OIS contracts do not involve any initial cash flow, minimising liquidity
risk. Third, because many OIS contracts are collateralised, credit risk is also minimised (Tabb
and Grundfest, 2013). Finally, unlike many LIBOR-based instruments, OIS contracts have
increased in popularity following the 2007-2008 financial crisis (Cheng, Dorji, and Lantz, 2010).
Within the US, OIS rates offer potential advantages over FFFs rates too. First, OIS rates
are now available at maturities in excess of 3 years. Cheng et al. (2010) state that OIS contracts
tend to be liquid out to at least the 3-year horizon. FFFs are traded at up to a 3-year horizon,
but remain largely illiquid at maturities in excess of 1 year. Second, the horizon of OIS contracts
on a given day aligns with the horizon of government bond yields, whereas the horizon of FFFs
contracts is a specific calendar month in the future, changing only at the beginning of a new
calendar month. This permits easier comparison across financial instruments than FFFs.5
These promising features of OIS contracts have been recognised in papers assessing the
efficacy of recent ‘unconventional’ monetary policies and their effect on expectations of future
short-term interest rates (e.g. Christensen and Rudebusch, 2012; Woodford, 2012; Lloyd, 2017b).
4For example, the floating reference rate on US OIS contracts is the effective federal funds rate.
5Lloyd (2017a) proposes a method for estimating interest rate expectations out to a 10-year horizon that
combines OIS rates and zero-coupon government bond yields.
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Yet, despite the growing use of OIS rates as measures of interest rate expectations, no study
has formally assessed the empirical success of OIS rates for this purpose.
In this paper, I address two questions. First, how accurate are implied interest rate ex-
pectations from US OIS rates, and how do they compare to those from FFFs? This offers a
useful benchmark for comparison, as the behaviour of FFFs rates has been widely studied (e.g.
Gu¨rkaynak et al., 2007; Piazzesi and Swanson, 2008; Hamilton, 2009). Second, how accurate
are implied interest rate expectations from OIS rates in other countries — specifically the UK,
Eurozone and Japan? This is important for the global application of OIS rates as a financial
market-based measure of monetary policy expectations.
To compare US OIS rates and FFFs, I build on the methodology of Piazzesi and Swanson
(2008) and calculate ex post excess returns on these instruments. In order to perform this
comparison accurately, I design a method to ensure that the horizons of OIS and FFFs contracts
are identical. I create ‘portfolios’ of FFFs contracts and compare them to US OIS rates on the
penultimate business day of each month. Plots of the unconditional ex post excess returns
on OIS contracts and comparable-maturity portfolios of FFFs strongly indicate that OIS and
FFFs rates contain similar information pertaining to investors’ expectations of future short-term
interest rates. I find that 1 to 11-month OIS contracts provide measures of investors’ interest
rate expectations that are as good as those from comparable-horizon FFFs contracts.
I then assess the global comparability of OIS rates. I first calculate the average ex post excess
returns on US contracts using daily data to attain a benchmark against which to compare global
OIS rates. The average ex post returns on US OIS contracts are comparable at monthly and
daily frequencies, indicating that the OIS-FFF comparison is not blurred by calendar effects.
Between 2002 and 2016, 1 to 24-month US OIS contracts, on average, provide accurate measures
of investors’ expectations of future short-term interest rates. I then calculate the average ex
post excess returns on UK, Eurozone and Japanese OIS contracts at the same daily frequency.
I find that, on average, 1 to 24-month OIS contracts in these jurisdictions also provide accurate
measures of investors’ expectations of future short-term interest rates.
These results have important implications for the future fashioning of an empirical toolkit
for monetary economists. OIS rates have a useful role to play as a globally comparable market-
based measure of interest rate expectations in empirical and policy research on positive and
normative economic questions from a global, non-US-centric, perspective.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes FFFs and OIS
contracts. Section 3 presents the empirical comparison of FFFs and OIS. The global comparison
of OIS contracts is in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Financial Market Instruments
2.1 Federal Funds Futures (FFFs)
FFFs contracts were introduced by the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 1988 and are unique
to US financial markets. They have a variety of maturities extending to the first 35 calendar
4
months into the future. The contracts pay out at maturity based on the average effective federal
funds rate realised in the calendar month specified in the contract. For example, the first FFF
settles based on the average effective federal funds rate for the calendar month in which the
contract was purchased. The second FFF settles based on the average effective federal funds
rate in the calendar month subsequent to purchase, and so on.
Let pFFFt,t+n denote the price of the FFFs contract purchased on a given day during month t
that settles based on the average daily effective federal funds rate (an annualised rate) during
month t + n (the ‘delivery month’) ffrt+n, for n = 0, 1, ..., 35.
6 The contract matures at
the end of the calendar month t + n, with settlement occurring on the subsequent day. The
contract settles at “100 minus the arithmetic average of the daily effective federal funds rate
during the delivery month”.7 The price quote is equal to 100 minus the expectation of the
average daily effective federal funds rate in the delivery month. As such, the n-month FFFs
rate, iFFFt,t+n = 100− pFFFt,t+n, represents market participants’ expectations of the average effective
federal funds rate in the delivery month. Thus, for the buyer of the contract, the ex post realised
(annualised) excess return equals:8
rxFFFt,t+n = i
FFF
t,t+n − ffrt+n (1)
where ffrt+n is the ex post realised average daily effective federal funds rate for month t+ n.
9
Under the expectations hypothesis, the FFF rate iFFFt,t+n must equal the ex ante expectation
of the average daily effective federal funds rate ffrt+n for the contract month t+ n:
iFFFt,t+n = Et
[
ffrt+n
]
(2)
Thus, if the ex post realised excess return in (1) has zero mean, the ex ante forecasting error
under the expectations hypothesis also has zero mean, and the n-month FFF can be said to
provide an accurate measure of expected future short-term interest rates.
2.2 Overnight Indexed Swaps (OIS)
An OIS is an over-the-counter traded interest rate derivative with two participating agents who
agree to exchange fixed and floating interest payments over a notional principal for the life of
the contract. The floating leg of the contract is constructed by calculating the accrued interest
payments from a strategy of investing the notional principal in an overnight reference rate and
6That is, n = 1 refers to the one-month ahead contract (FF2 on financial market platforms); n = 2 the
two-month ahead contract (FF3), and so on.
7See CME Rulebook, Chapter 22, 22101: www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/CBOT/V/22/22.pdf.
8Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) remark that (1) treats FFFs contracts as forward contracts, abstracting from the
fact that futures contracts are ‘marked to market’. Nevertheless, they demonstrate that the empirical difference
between the precise definition of the ex post realised excess return on FFFs contracts, which accounts for marking
to market, and (1) is small and does not influence their results for FFFs contracts. As in the main body of Piazzesi
and Swanson (2008), I therefore use (1) to define ex post realised excess returns for simplicity.
9The ex post realised average effective federal funds rate for month t+n is formally calculated as the arithmetic
mean of the daily effective federal funds rate for the contract month, where the rate on non-business days is defined
to be the rate that prevailed on the preceding business day.
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repeating this on an overnight basis for the duration of the contract, investing principal plus
interest each time. The reference rate for US OIS contracts is the effective federal funds rate,
while for UK, Eurozone and Japanese contracts the reference rates are SONIA, EONIA and
TONAR, respectively. The ‘OIS rate’ represents the rate on the fixed leg of the contract. For a
vanilla OIS contract with a maturity of one year or less, money is only exchanged at the conclu-
sion of the contract. Upon settlement, only the net cash flow is exchanged between the parties.10
That is, if the accrued fixed interest rate payment exceeds the floating interest payment, the
agent who took on the former payments must pay the other at settlement. Importantly, there
is no exchange of principal at any time for OIS contracts of all maturities.
Due to the features of the contracts, OIS rates are closely linked to investors’ expectations
of future overnight interest rates over the horizon of the contract. Specifically, liquidity premia
on OIS contracts should be small because there is no initial cash flow and, as an OIS contract is
in zero net supply, it is unclear which party would demand a liquidity premium. Counterparty
risk is small because there is no exchange of principal. Moreover, because many OIS trades are
collateralised, credit risk is also minimised (Tabb and Grundfest, 2013, pp. 244-245). Finally,
unlike many LIBOR-based instruments, OIS contracts have increased in popularity amongst
investors following the 2007-2008 financial crisis (Cheng et al., 2010).
Let iOISt,t+n denote the annualised n-month OIS rate in month t, the swap’s fixed interest rate.
iFLTt,t+n is the annualised ex post realised (net) return from the floating leg of the same contract.
The floating leg of the contract iFLTt,t+n is calculated by considering a strategy in which an
investor borrows the swap’s notional principal x, invests in the overnight reference rate and
repeats the transaction on an overnight basis, investing principal plus interest each time. Let
the contract trade day be denoted t1−s, where s denotes the ‘spot lag’ of the contract in days.11
Suppose the n-month (N -day) contract matures on the day tN in month t+ n.
12 The floating
leg of the contract is calculated based on the realised overnight reference rate on days t1 to tN .
13
Thus, the contract settlement period is given by the days t1, t2, ..., tN . The floating overnight
reference rate for the OIS contract on day ti is denoted flti, for i = 1, ...N . Following market
convention, the expression for the floating leg of an n-month (N -day) OIS contract, purchased
on day t1−s, in month t is:
iFLTt,t+n =
 N∏
j=1
(1 + γjfltj)
− 1
× 360
N
(3)
where γj is the accrual factor of the form γj = Dj/360, where Dj is the day count between
10For contracts with maturity in excess of one year, the net cash flow exchange occurs at the end of every year.
11In the US market, OIS payment calculations begin with a two-day spot lag (s = 2) from the trade date, so
the trade day is labelled t−1. The same spot lag is included in Eurozone and Japanese OIS contracts. However,
the spot lag on UK contracts is zero days, so the trade day is t1.
12That is, the contract matures on day tN , (s− 1) +N days after the trade date t1−s.
13The floating leg is calculated using the actual month lengths, not normalised month lengths.
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business days tj and tj+1.
14 To compare this floating leg to the fixed leg iOISt,t+n, which is reported
on an annualised basis, iFLTt,t+n is a multiple of 360/N in (3).
15
From the perspective of an agent who swaps fixed interest payments for the floating rate
over the notional principal x,
(
iOISt,t+n − iFLTt,t+n
)×x represents the payoff of a zero-cost portfolio.16
Thus, the ex post realised (annualised) excess return on the n-month OIS contract purchased
during month t is:
rxOISt,t+n = i
OIS
t,t+n − iFLTt,t+n (4)
Under the expectations hypothesis, the fixed leg of the OIS contract must equal the ex ante
expectation of the floating leg:
iOISt,t+n = Et
[
iFLTt,t+n
]
(5)
Thus, if the ex post realised excess return in (4) has zero mean, the ex ante forecasting error
under the expectations hypothesis also has zero mean, and the n-month OIS contract can be
said to provide an accurate measure of expected future short-term interest rates.
3 A Comparison of US OIS and FFFs Rates
3.1 Comparing OIS and FFFs Rates
(1) and (4) provide definitions for the ex post realised excess returns on FFFs and OIS contracts
respectively. However, a direct comparison of excess returns of the two instruments on any given
day is prevented by two distinct complications which motivate my empirical strategy.
First, an n-month ahead FFF contract traded in the calendar month t has the same settle-
ment date, regardless of the day in the month it is traded. In contrast, the n-month (N -day)
OIS contract has a settlement horizon spanning the n-months (N -days) subsequent to the trade
date (once the spot lag has been accounted for). This difference is depicted in figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 illustrates that an n-month ahead FFF contract traded on day t−1 in month t pertains
to the same time horizon as an n-month ahead FFF contract traded on a different day td−1
in the same calendar month t. Figure 2 demonstrates that an n-month US OIS contract, with
N days to maturity and a two-day spot lag, traded on day t−1 settles based on the geometric
average of the daily effective federal funds rate from day t1 (accounting for the spot lag) to
tN (the maturity date), while the n-month contract traded on a different day td−1 in the same
month t settles based on the geometric average of the daily effective federal funds rate from day
td+1 to td+N .
14For example, on a week with no public holidays, the day count Dj will be set to 1 on Monday to Thursday, 3
on Friday, and 0 on Saturday and Sunday. That is, the floating overnight reference rate on a non-business day is
defined as the rate that prevailed on the preceding business day. For US and Eurozone contracts, the day count
is divided by 360, while for UK and Japanese contracts it is divided by 365, as per market convention.
15This accords with US and Eurozone market quoting conventions. Specifically, the fixed and floating legs of
US OIS contracts are quoted according to the Actual 360 convention. The UK and Japanese market quoting
convention is Actual 365, so the floating rate is a multiple of 365/N instead (OpenGamma, 2013, p. 6).
16Formally, this portfolio involves borrowing x at the floating overnight index rate at day t1 and rolling over
the borrowing to day tN , while investing the x borrowed on day t1 in the fixed interest rate i
OIS
t,t+n to day tN .
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Figure 1: The Horizon of Federal Funds Futures Contracts Traded on Different Days, t−1 and
td−1, in the Month t
Note: This figure depicts the horizons of federal funds futures (FFFs) contracts traded on different days, t−1 and
td−1, in the calendar month t. An n-month ahead FFF contract purchased on day t−1 in month t pertains to the
same time horizon as an n-month ahead FFF contract purchased on a different day td−1 in the same calendar
month t.
Figure 2: The Horizon of Overnight Indexed Swap Contracts Traded on Different Days, t−1
and td−1, in the Month t
Note: The figure depicts the horizons of US overnight indexed swap (OIS) contracts traded on different days,
t−1 and td−1, in the calendar month t. The horizon of an n-month OIS contract purchased on day t−1 in month
t spans from day t1 (accounting for a two business day spot lag according to US market convention) to day tN in
month t+ n. In contrast, the horizon of an n-month OIS contract purchased on a different day td−1 of the same
calendar month t spans from day td+1 to day td+N in month t+ n.
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Second, the horizon of an n-month FFF contract purchased on any day t−1 in month t
pertains to a specific calendar month in the future t+ n, while the horizon of an n-month OIS
contract purchased on the same day t−1 of month t spans the n months (N days) subsequent
to the date t1 (accounting for the two business day spot lag for US contracts). Figures 1 and
2 illustrate this. In figure 2, the n-month OIS contract traded on day t−1 of month t has a
horizon spanning from day t1 (accounting for the spot lag) in month t to day tN in month t+n.
In contrast, the n-month ahead FFF contract traded on the same day t−1 in month t has a
horizon corresponding to the calendar month t+ n only (see figure 1).
To address these complications and attain comparable measures of ex post realised excess
returns on FFFs and OIS contracts, I perform two data transformations.
First, I construct hypothetical n-month ‘portfolios’ of FFFs contracts that are traded in
month t with horizons that begin on the first day of month t+ 1 and conclude on the final day
of month t+ n. To construct the interest rate on the n-month FFFs-portfolio iFFF,portt,t+n , I take
the arithmetic average of the 1, 2, ..., n-month ahead FFFs rates on a given day in month t:
iFFF,portt,t+n =
1
N
n∑
j=1
Nji
FFF
t,t+j (6)
where Nj denotes the number of days in month t+ j and N ≡
∑n
j=1Nj is the total number of
days in months t+ 1, ..., t+ n.
This hypothetical n-month contract settles based on the arithmetic average of the daily
effective federal funds rate from the first day of month t+1 to the final day of month t+n, denoted
ffr
port
t+n =
1
N
∑n
j=1Njffrt+j .
17 Thus, the ex post realised excess return on the hypothetical n-
month portfolio of FFFs contracts, relative to the contract’s settlement, is defined as:18
rxFFF,portt,t+n = i
FFF,port
t,t+n − ffr
port
t+n (7)
Second, the horizon of an n-month US OIS contract will only match the horizon of an n-
month portfolio of FFFs contracts on the penultimate business day of a given month because
of the two-day spot lag in US OIS contracts. Figure 3 demonstrates this. Here, day t−1 is the
penultimate business day of month t. The horizon of the n-month OIS contract traded on this
day begins on day t1, the first day of the month t+ 1, because of the spot lag in the contract.
17The ex post realised average effective federal funds rate from the beginning of month t + 1 to the end of
month t+ n is formally calculated as the arithmetic mean of the daily effective federal funds rate for the period,
where the rate on non-business days is defined to be the rate that prevailed on the preceding business day. I use
the arithmetic average in accordance with FFFs market convention.
18With the exception of the 1-month horizon, the timing of receipts from an n-month OIS contract differs from
an n-month portfolio of FFFs. Unlike an OIS contract, the portfolio of FFFs does not provide a single payoff
at the end of its n-month horizon, but one at the end of each month as each FFFs contract matures. This is
mitigated by focusing on the ex post realised excess returns on the portfolios, assuming that FFFs receipts prior
to month t+n can earn a compounded return equal to the effective federal funds rate until the portfolio matures.
For example, at the end of month t+ 1, the investor earns an excess return from the 1-month FFFs contract in
the portfolio rxFFFt,t+1, which could earn compounded interest at the effective federal funds rate from the first day
of month t+ 2 to maturity at t+ n. Because (7) defines an ex post excess return, the interest earned on rxFFFt,t+1
and the interest foregone exactly cancel, so do not feature on the right-hand side of (7).
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Figure 3: The Horizon of Federal Funds Futures, Overnight Indexed Swap Contracts and
Portfolios of Federal Funds Futures Traded on the Penultimate Business Day t−1 in Month t
Note: The figure depicts the horizons of an n-month ahead federal funds futures (FFFs) contract, an n-month
overnight indexed swap (OIS) contract, and a hypothetical n-month portfolio of FFFs contracts — defined in
equation (6) — traded on the penultimate business day t−1 in the calendar month t. The horizon of an n-month
OIS contract purchased on the penultimate business day t−1 of month t spans from day t1, the first day of month
t+1, to day tN , the final day in month t+n. The horizon of the hypothetical n-month portfolio of FFFs contracts
purchased on the same day t−1 of the same calendar month t spans the same period.
It concludes on day tN , the final day of month t+ n. The horizon of the hypothetical n-month
portfolio of FFFs contracts, defined in (6), spans the same period. Because of this, I compare
the ex post realised excess returns on n-month OIS contracts and n-month portfolios of FFFs
contracts for the month t on the penultimate business day of that month, using the definitions
in (4) and (7) respectively.19 This yields a monthly time series of ex post realised excess returns
for OIS and FFFs contracts that are comparable in horizon and formed on the same date.
Figure 4 plots the time series of unconditional ex post excess returns on 1, 3, 6 and 9-month
OIS contracts and portfolios of FFFs contracts on the penultimate business day of each month.
These plots preview some of the conclusions from the formal empirical analysis. Notably, at all
tenors, unconditional ex post excess returns on OIS contracts and portfolios of FFFs contracts
are strikingly similar for the majority of the 2002-2016 period. The plots strongly suggest that
these OIS and FFFs rates contain similar information about financial market participants’ ex-
pectations of future short-term interest rates. Although the excess returns fluctuate around zero
for most of the period, the plots exhibit notable spikes during the 2007-2008 period, indicative
of money market turmoil that influenced overnight interbank rates and ex ante unexpected
monetary policy loosening in response to the 2007-2008 financial crisis. For this reason, I later
19Although the horizons of iOISt,t+n and i
FFF,port
t,t+n traded on day t−1 match, these returns are not exactly com-
parable since the former is based on geometric compounding whereas the latter is not — as it is computed using
an arithmetic average. This issue is mitigated by focusing on the ex post realised excess returns in (4) and (7),
since they use the geometric and arithmetic average of the floating rate, respectively.
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Figure 4: Unconditional Ex Post Excess Returns on US Overnight Indexed Swaps and
Portfolios of Federal Funds Futures with Equivalent Horizon
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Note: Time series plots of unconditional ex post excess returns for US OIS rates (solid red line) and portfolios of
FFFs contracts (dashed black line) calculated using equations (4) and (7), respectively. The portfolios of FFFs
contracts are constructed such that their horizon is equivalent to the horizon of corresponding-maturity OIS
rates. The horizontal axis of each plot denotes the date of the ex post excess return and is labelled MM/YY. The
data is plotted on penultimate business days of each month from January 2002 to December 2016.
conduct sensitivity analyses to account for the effects of the financial crisis and associated
monetary policy loosening on estimated average ex post excess returns.
3.2 Regressions
To estimate the average ex post excess returns on US OIS contracts and comparable-horizon
portfolios of FFFs contracts, I run the following regressions, for US OIS rates:
rxOISt,t+n = α
OIS
n + ε
OIS
t+n (8)
and for the hypothetical portfolios of FFFs:
rxFFF,portt,t+n = α
FFF,port
n + ε
FFF,port
t+n (9)
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for different monthly contract horizons n = 1, 2, ..., 11.20
All regressions are estimated using data observations on the penultimate business day of
each calendar month. The sample runs from January 2002 to December 2016. The specific
sample start date differs slightly across horizons due to the availability of US OIS rates at
different tenors.21 The selection of maturities is determined by FFFs rate data availability.22
Because contract horizons at adjacent time periods overlap, I compute standard errors us-
ing the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent procedure of Hodrick (1992), which
generalises the Hansen and Hodrick (1980) method for overlapping contracts to the case of
heteroskedasticity. Throughout the paper, I report t-statistics based on these standard errors.
In regressions (8) and (9), αOISn and α
FFF,port
n denote the average ex post excess return on OIS
contracts and portfolios of FFFs respectively. If these are insignificantly different from zero,
a contract is said to provide an accurate measure of expected future short-term interest rates.
Because the reference rate on an OIS contract is a short-term money market rate, this empirical
strategy formally analyses OIS rates as measures of short-term interest rate expectations, an
indicator of the de facto monetary policy stance, rather than official policy rate settings.
Table 1 presents the baseline results from the estimation of (8) and (9) for the whole sample.
Estimated average ex post realised excess returns are presented for the 1 to 11-month OIS and
portfolios of FFFs contracts using observations on the penultimate business day of each month.
The primary result is that 1 to 11-month OIS contracts provide measures of investors’
interest rate expectations that are as good as those from corresponding-maturity portfolios of
FFFs contracts, corroborating with the information plotted in figure 4. In fact, for the 3 to 11-
month tenors, the average ex post excess return on US OIS contracts is marginally smaller than
that on the corresponding-maturity portfolio of FFFs contracts. For example, the average ex
post excess return on the 8-month OIS contract is 11.43 basis points, 0.76 basis points lower than
the average ex post excess return on the corresponding-maturity portfolio of FFFs contracts.
Although the average ex post excess returns on 1 to 6-month OIS contracts are significant at the
10% level, at least, the same is true for 1 to 7-month portfolios of FFFs contracts. Moreover, in
all cases, the average ex post excess returns are small — less than 9 basis points at the 6-month
horizon — and subsequent analysis indicates that much of this can be explained by ex ante
unexpected US monetary policy loosening in 2008.
A secondary result is that average excess returns on OIS contracts, as well as portfolios of
FFFs contracts, are increasing with the maturity of the contracts. This is consistent with the
view that longer-horizon OIS rates may contain some term premia (Michaud and Upper, 2008).
20In appendix B, I also provide estimates of excess returns on n-month ahead (‘pure’) FFFs contracts using
the regression:
rxFFFt,t+n = α
FFF
n + ε
FFF
t+n
to check that the data transformation used to construct hypothetical portfolios of FFFs contracts does not
influence the results.
21See appendix A for a complete list of data sources and a detailed discussion of OIS rate availability.
22Although available prior to 2002, regular series for 12 to 36-month ahead FFFs rates are not available for
the whole post-2002 period.
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Table 1: Average Ex Post Excess Returns on US OIS Contracts and Portfolios of FFFs
Contracts of Comparable Maturity
Panel A: US OIS Contracts
Maturity in Months 1 2 3 4 5 6
α̂OISn 1.35*** 2.52** 3.81** 5.22* 6.73* 8.45*
[t-statistic] [2.72] [2.19] [1.98] [1.92] [1.86] [1.81]
Maturity in Months 7a 8a 9 10a 11a
α̂OISn 9.89 11.43 14.03 15.05 17.16
[t-statistic] [1.64] [1.52] [1.56] [1.39] [1.36]
Panel B: Portfolios of FFFs Contracts
Maturity in Months 1 2 3 4 5 6
α̂FFF,portn 1.22*** 2.44** 3.82* 5.30* 6.85* 8.52*
[t-statistic] [2.39] [2.01] [1.91] [1.88] [1.83] [1.76]
Maturity in Months 7 8 9 10 11
α̂FFF,portn 10.36* 12.19 14.16 17.06 19.05
[t-statistic] [1.68] [1.60] [1.53] [1.51] [1.43]
Note: Panel A reports results from regression (8) and panel B reports results from regression (9) for con-
tracts/portfolios with 1-11 month maturity. Sample: Monthly Frequency, January 2002 to December 2016,
but for those indicated by a May 2002 to December 2016 (due to OIS rate availability). Hodrick (1992)
t-statistics are reported in square brackets. An excess return is significantly different from zero at the 1%,
5% and 10% significance level when the absolute value of the t-statistic exceeds 2.33, 1.96, 1.645 respectively.
These are denoted with asterisks ***, ** and * for the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. All
figures are reported in basis points to two decimal places.
Accounting for the 2008 US Monetary Policy Loosening During and after the 2007-
2008 financial crisis, monetary policymakers lowered policy rates to their ELB. This was broadly
unanticipated ex ante and, for this reason, may bias upwards the ex post excess returns presented
in table 1. That is, the positive ex post excess returns in table 1 may actually reflect the
unexpected policy loosening that occurred in response to the financial crisis and associated
recession, rather than an excess return that reflects risk premia in OIS or FFFs contracts.
For this reason, I re-estimate (8) and (9) and include an additional dummy explanatory
variable. This dummy is set to unity for periods in which the n-month OIS contract and
portfolio of FFFs contracts measure expectations of future short-term interest rates during
2008, and zero otherwise. This choice aligns with the period in which US monetary policy
was quickly loosened in response to the financial crisis and the associated recession.23 For the
1-month contract, the dummy is set to unity from December 2007 to December 2008 (inclusive);
for the 2-month contract, the dummy is set to unity from November 2007 to December 2008
(inclusive); and so on. Consequently, with the dummy variable included in the regression,
αOISn and α
FFF,port
n now represent the average ex post excess return on OIS and portfolios of
FFFs outside the 2008 period, respectively. The coefficient on the dummy variable captures the
average additional increase in ex post excess returns attributable to the unpredicted nature of
the 2007-2008 financial crisis and associated monetary policy loosening during 2008.
The results from these extended regressions are reported in table 2. The estimates of αOISn
23The federal funds rate target fell from 4.75% at the start of 2008 to 0-0.25% in December 2008.
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and αFFF,portn are noticeably smaller than in table 1, typically at least half as small. The
headline conclusion from table 1 is robust to the inclusion of a 2008 dummy. For 1 to 11-month
OIS contracts, average ex post excess returns for the non-2008 period are quantitatively small,
and the coefficients are statistically insignificant for the 5 to 11-month tenors. They are also
quantitatively smaller than corresponding-maturity FFFs contracts. For example, the average
ex post excess return for the 9-month OIS contract outside the 2008 period is 3.32 basis points,
10.71 basis points lower than its average ex post excess return for the whole 2002-2016 period
and 0.94 basis points lower than the average ex post excess return on the comparable-maturity
portfolio of FFFs contracts outside the 2008 period. Although the average ex post excess returns
on OIS contracts for the non-2008 period are statistically significant at the 5% level for the 1
to 3-month tenors, and at the 10% level for the 4-month contract, their magnitude is small; the
average ex post excess return on the 4-month OIS contract for the non-2008 period is just 1.54
basis points, 0.62 basis points lower than the comparable-maturity portfolio of FFFs. Thus, the
usefulness of 1 to 11-month OIS rates as market-based measures of monetary policy expectations
remains comparable to FFFs rates outside of the 2008 financial crisis period.
The coefficients on the 2008 dummy highlight the ex ante unpredicted nature of the financial
crisis and associated policy loosening. For the OIS regressions in panel A of table 2, the coeffi-
cients on the 2008 dummy are positive and statistically significant, at the 5% level at least, for
the 1 to 11-month OIS contracts. Moreover, the 2008 dummy coefficients are broadly increasing
in the maturity of the OIS contracts, indicating that the extent to which the 2008 policy loos-
ening was unanticipated increases at longer horizons. Interestingly, although the coefficients on
the 2008 dummy for the FFFs regressions in panel B follow a similar qualitative pattern, the
coefficients are statistically insignificant for 2 to 3-month portfolios of FFFs contracts. This
implies that, at these maturities, FFFs rates did not include any statistically significant addi-
tional ex post excess returns during the 2008 period relative to the non-2008 period, indicating
that the quality of these FFFs tenors as predictors of the future monetary policy stance did not
significantly change during that period.
Overall, the results in tables 1 and 2 indicate that 1 to 11-month OIS rates provide measures
of investors’ interest rate expectations that are at least as good as those from comparable-horizon
FFFs. This is important because FFFs have long been used to forecast future monetary policy,
yet because OIS rates are available at longer maturities than FFFs and in a range of countries,
OIS rates potentially offer a globally comparable financial market measure of monetary policy
expectations.
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Table 2: Ex Post Excess Returns on US OIS Contracts and Portfolios of FFFs Contracts
After Controlling for a 2008 Dummy
Panel A: US OIS Contracts
Maturity in Months 1 2 3 4 5 6
α̂OISn 0.50** 0.86** 1.14** 1.54* 1.91 2.22
[t-statistic] [1.98] [2.22] [1.96] [1.76] [1.55] [1.35]
2008 Dummy 12.76** 22.70** 33.70*** 43.14*** 52.72*** 63.78***
[t-statistic] [2.33] [2.11] [2.44] [3.34] [7.39] [−7.54]
Maturity in Months 7a 8a 9 10a 11a
α̂OISn 3.49 3.58 3.32 3.86 3.96
[t-statistic] [1.24] [1.07] [0.81] [0.83] [0.72]
2008 Dummy 60.11*** 69.37*** 91.54*** 88.47*** 99.03***
[t-statistic] [−6.21] [−7.13] [−10.26] [9.39] [6.73]
Panel B: Portfolios of FFFs Contracts
Maturity in Months 1 2 3 4 5 6
α̂FFF,portn 0.54* 1.18* 1.92* 2.16* 2.54 2.93
[t-statistic] [1.82] [1.79] [1.70] [1.64] [1.43] [1.32]
2008 Dummy 9.71* 16.56 22.92 35.20*** 44.95*** 54.56***
[t-statistic] [1.77] [1.44] [1.53] [2.43] [4.82] [−6.25]
Maturity in Months 7 8 9 10 11
α̂FFF,portn 3.49 3.98 4.26 7.43 9.84
[t-statistic] [1.24] [1.14] [1.00] [1.11] [1.07]
2008 Dummy 63.01*** 71.33*** 81.16*** 73.31*** 65.26***
[t-statistic] [−5.00] [−6.06] [−12.03] [4.25] [2.93]
Note: Panel A reports results from regression (8) and panel B reports results from regression (9) with an
additional dummy variable set equal to one on dates when a contract’s horizon spans the year 2008. Sample:
Monthly Frequency, January 2002 to December 2016, but for those indicated by a May 2002 to December 2016
(due to OIS rate availability). Hodrick (1992) t-statistics are reported in square brackets. An excess return
is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level when the absolute value of the
t-statistic exceeds 2.33, 1.96, 1.645 respectively. These are denoted with asterisks ***, ** and * for the 1%,
5% and 10% significance levels respectively. All figures are reported in basis points to two decimal places.
4 OIS Rates from a Global Perspective
Here, I assess whether OIS rates accurately measure monetary policy expectations globally.
4.1 US OIS Contracts
I calculate unconditional ex post excess returns on US OIS contracts at a daily frequency,
between January 2002 and December 2016, for the following tenors: 1 to 12 months; 15, 18
and 21 months; 2, 3, 4 and 5 years.24 I estimate (8) using this daily frequency data. Again,
t-statistics use heteroskedasicity and autocorrelation robust Hodrick (1992) standard errors.
Panel A of table 3 presents the results from these regressions. Daily frequency average
ex post excess returns on 1 to 11-month OIS contracts are similar to their excess returns at
a monthly frequency reported in table 1, indicating that monthly frequency estimates from
24The choice of tenors is determined by data availability. See appendix A.
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Table 3: Average Ex Post Excess Returns on US OIS Contracts at Daily Frequency
Panel A: US OIS Contracts
Maturity in Months 1 2 3 4 5
α̂OISn 1.34* 2.54* 3.86* 5.32* 6.87*
[t-statistic] [1.79] [1.79] [1.81] [1.79] [1.69]
Maturity in Months 6 7a 8a 9 10a
α̂OISn 8.54 9.93 11.54 14.09 15.20
[t-statistic] [1.56] [1.39] [1.30] [1.34] [1.22]
Maturity in Months 11a 12 15 18 21
α̂OISn 17.24 20.98 27.61 35.59 44.25
[t-statistic] [1.20] [1.32] [1.33] [1.43] [1.60]
Maturity in Months 24 36b 48b 60b
α̂OISn 53.27* 86.86*** 126.32*** 173.60***
[t-statistic] [1.86] [4.61] [−5.37] [−8.48]
Panel B: US OIS Contracts with 2008 Dummy
Maturity in Months 1 2 3 4 5
α̂OISn 0.41* 0.76* 1.14* 1.50 1.90
[t-statistic] [1.75] [1.80] [1.75] [1.61] [1.40]
2008 Dummy 14.11 24.65** 34.79*** 45.33*** 54.76***
[t-statistic] [1.58] [2.00] [3.08] [−10.78] [−5.04]
Maturity in Months 6 7a 8a 9a 10a
α̂OISn 2.22 1.88 1.86 3.28 2.41
[t-statistic] [1.19] [0.83] [0.60] [0.72] [0.48]
2008 Dummy 65.20*** 76.26*** 86.01*** 93.12*** 101.68***
[t-statistic] [−8.34] [14.75] [10.53] [9.79] [9.78]
Maturity in Months 11a 12 15 18 21
α̂OISn 2.93 5.73 8.34 12.11 16.02
[t-statistic] [0.48] [0.68] [0.65] [0.74] [0.84]
2008 Dummy 108.41*** 112.22*** 123.26*** 131.95*** 141.13***
[t-statistic] [10.56] [13.46] [−11.47] [−7.16] [−6.00]
Maturity in Months 24 36b 48b 60b
α̂OISn 20.91 43.47** 84.49*** 155.05***
[t-statistic] [1.07] [2.01] [3.57] [21.59]
2008 Dummy 145.15*** 132.62*** 93.14*** 31.15
[t-statistic] [−4.77] [−55.52] [3.07] [0.99]
Note: Results from regression (8) for daily frequency OIS contracts. Sample: Daily Frequency,
January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2016, but for those indicated by a May 7, 2002 to December
31, 2016 and b February 14, 2002 to December 31, 2016 (due to OIS rate availability). Hodrick
(1992) t-statistics are reported in square brackets. An excess return is significantly different from
zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level when the absolute value of the t-statistic exceeds
2.33, 1.96, 1.645 respectively. These are denoted with asterisks ***, ** and * for the 1%, 5% and
10% significance levels respectively. All figures are reported in basis points to two decimal places.
The 2008 dummy is set equal to unity on dates where the OIS contract horizon overlaps with the
January 22, 2008 to December 16, 2008 US monetary policy loosening.
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section 3 are not susceptible to calendar effects. For example, the average ex post excess return
on the 9-month OIS contract calculated with daily frequency data is 14.09 basis points, while
the corresponding figure calculated using observations on the penultimate business day of each
month is just 0.06 basis points lower at 14.03 basis points. The average ex post excess returns
on the 1 to 5-month OIS contracts are significant at the 10% level for the whole 2002-2016
sample, but remain quantitatively small — not exceeding 6.87 basis points.
The 12 to 21-month OIS contracts, for which section 3 did not present monthly frequency
results, exhibit statistically insignificant ex post excess returns for the 2002-2016 sample period.
As with the 1 to 11-month tenors, the estimated average ex post excess returns on the 12 to
21-month contracts are increasing in the contract horizon, but remain insignificantly different
from zero. At the 2-year horizon, the average ex post excess return is 53.27 basis points —
over double the excess return on the 1-year contract of 20.98 basis points — and is statistically
significant at the 10% level. In subsequent sensitivity analysis, I conclude that this marginal
significance is primarily driven by the money market turmoil and unanticipated loosening of
monetary policy during 2007-2008, as opposed to risk premia within the contract.
At longer horizons — 3, 4 and 5 years — OIS contracts have statistically significant positive
ex post excess returns at the 1% level, indicative of term premia in longer-horizon OIS rates
that blur their use as market-based measures of monetary policy expectations.
Accounting for 2008 US Monetary Policy Loosening As a sensitivity test, I regress
the daily frequency unconditional ex post excess returns of OIS contracts on a constant and a
2008 dummy. As in section 3, this dummy is defined to capture the unanticipated nature of US
monetary policy loosening in the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. This regression accounts
for the possibility that the unanticipated 2008 monetary policy loosening biases estimates of
average ex post excess returns on OIS contracts upwards. That is, the positive average ex post
excess returns presented in panel A of table 3 may actually reflect the ex ante unexpected nature
of monetary policy accommodation during 2008, rather than risk premia in OIS contracts that
complicate their use as a market-based measure of monetary policy expectations. As before,
I define a 2008 dummy for each OIS contract maturity, set equal to unity on dates where the
horizon of an OIS contract overlaps with the 2008 US policy accommodation. I define the policy
accommodation period as January 22, 2008 — the first date on which the US policy rate was
lowered in 2008 — to December 16, 2008 — the date on which the federal funds rate target was
lowered to 0-0.25%.25 Here, the estimated αOISn coefficient can be interpreted as the average ex
post excess return on an n-month OIS contract in periods for which the contract’s horizon did
not overlap with the 2008 US monetary policy loosening. The coefficient on the 2008 dummy
captures the additional increase in ex post excess returns during the 2008 period.
The results in panel B of table 3 further support the main conclusions of the paper. In
particular, the average ex post excess returns outside the 2008 period on 4 to 24-month OIS
25That is, for the 1-month OIS contract the dummy is set to 1 on days between December 22, 2007 and
December 16, 2008 (inclusive) and zero otherwise. For the 2-month OIS contract, the dummy is set to 1 on days
between November 22, 2007 and December 16, 2008 (inclusive) and zero otherwise.
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contracts are insignificantly different from zero, and are all substantially smaller than the esti-
mated average ex post excess return for the whole 2002-2016 sample. For example, the average
ex post excess return on the 8-month contract for the non-2008 period is 1.86 basis points,
approximately 1/6th of the corresponding average for the whole 2002-2016 period. Although
the average ex post excess returns on 1 to 3-month OIS contracts are significant at the 10%
level, they are small — less than 1.14 basis points — indicating that OIS rates at these tenors
do provide accurate measures of interest rate expectations.
The 2-year OIS contract exhibits an average ex post excess return of 20.91 basis points for
the non-2008 period, a figure which is insignificantly different from zero. Thus, the (marginally)
significant average figure for the whole 2002-2016 period appears to be a result of the unantici-
pated events of 2008, rather than risk premia in the contract. Aside the 2008 period, the 2-year
OIS contract is able to successfully predict the future monetary policy stance.
At longer horizons — 3, 4 and 5 years — OIS contracts still exhibit significant term premia
in the non-2008 period. However, the average ex post excess returns on these contracts for
the non-2008 period are smaller than for the 2002-2016 period as a whole. For example, the
non-2008 average ex post excess return for the 3-year contract is 43.47 basis points, which is
approximately half the estimate for the whole 2002-2016 sample.
For the 2 to 48-month tenors, the 2008 dummy coefficients are all positive and significant,
consistent with the claim that the 2008 monetary policy loosening was ex ante unexpected.
Accounting for 2007-2008 Money Market Turmoil Although the average ex post excess
returns on 1 to 3-month OIS contracts in panel B of table 3 are small, they are significant at
the 10% level. I conduct further sensitivity analysis by looking into the influence of 2007-2008
money market turmoil on estimated ex post excess returns. The money market turmoil of
2007-2008 had notable implications for US overnight interest rates. Taylor and Williams (2009)
document that the effective federal funds rate, the OIS reference rate, jumped to unusually high
levels compared with the Fed’s target for the federal funds rate, the policy rate, on August 9,
2007.26 On the following day, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York pumped liquidity into the
market, leading to a marked fall in the effective federal funds rate relative to the federal funds
target rate, as shown in figure 5.27
In general, the impact of differences between reference and policy rates will be expected
to diminish at longer horizons, evidenced by the insignificant ex post excess returns on 4 to
24-month contracts reported in panel B of table 3. However, figure 5 illustrates that large
differences between the effective federal funds rate and the federal funds target rate occurred
during the 2007-2008 period, following money market turbulence that erupted on August 9, 2007
and, after some recovery in money market conditions during the first half of 2008, reignited after
the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The turbulence led to a dramatic change in
money market conditions.
26On August 9, 2007, the difference between the effective federal funds rate and the federal funds target rate
rose from 2 to 16 basis points.
27On August 10, 2007 the effective federal funds rate was 57 basis points below the federal funds target rate.
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Figure 5: Effective Federal Funds Rate Minus the Federal Funds Target Rate
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Note: This figure depicts the difference between the effective federal funds rate and the federal funds target rate
at a daily frequency from January 2002 to December 2016. From December 16, 2008, the difference is calculated
by assuming that the federal funds target rate was halfway between its lower and upper bounds. The grey areas
denote the periods of money market turbulence. The first begins on August 9, 2007 and ends on January 22,
2008, when the federal funds target rate was cut by 75 basis points. The second begins on September 15, 2008
— the day of Lehman Brothers’ failure — and ends on December 16, 2008. Data Source: Federal Reserve.
The relationship between the effective federal funds rate and the federal funds rate target
changed significantly during the period of initial money market turmoil, running from August
9, 2007 to January 21, 2008 — the day before the Federal Open Market Committee cut the
federal funds target rate by 75 basis points.28 The effective federal funds rate was significantly
below its target following the failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 until December
16, 2008 when the Fed cut its short-term policy rate to its ELB.29
Because the money market turmoil had a significant influence on the short-term interest
rates of direct relevance to OIS rates, I carry out further sensitivity analysis to account for the
28The average difference between the effective federal funds rate and the federal funds target rate prior to the
money market turmoil was 0 percent points. This figure is calculated using daily data from January 2, 2007 to
August 8, 2007 (N = 219 observations), with a standard deviation of 0.03 percent points. The corresponding
figure for the period of initial money market turmoil was −0.09 percent points. This figure is calculated using
daily data from August 9, 2007 to January 21, 2008 (N = 166 observations), with standard deviation of 0.21
percent points. The corresponding t-statistic from a difference-in-mean hypothesis test is statistically significant.
29The average difference between the effective federal funds rate and the federal funds target rate from Septem-
ber 15, 2008 to December 15, 2008 was −0.59 percent points.
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additional effect that this may have had on the ex post excess returns on OIS contracts. To
do this, I estimate (8) with three dummy variables: (i) a dummy variable for the initial money
market turmoil from August 9, 2007 to January 21, 2008; (ii) a dummy accounting for the
unanticipated monetary policy loosening between January 22, 2008 and September 14, 2008;
and (iii) a dummy to account for the money market turmoil and monetary policy loosening that
occurred between September 15, 2008 and December 16, 2008. As for the 2008 dummy in panel
B of table 3, the dummy variables are set to unity on dates when the horizon of an OIS contract
overlaps with the stated period — not only on the day the ex post excess return is recorded.
The results of these regressions are reported in table 4. The estimated αOISn coefficient can
be interpreted as the average ex post excess return on an n-month OIS contract in periods for
which the contract’s horizon did not overlap with the 2007-2008 US money market turbulence
and monetary policy loosening.
The main conclusions of the paper are strengthened by the inclusion of an additional money
market turmoil dummy. The average ex post excess returns on the 1 to 24-month US OIS
contracts are insignificantly different from zero outside the 2007-2008 period. At longer horizons
— 3, 4 and 5 years — OIS contracts still exhibit statistically significant ex post excess returns.
Moreover, the coefficients on the dummy variables indicate that the post-Lehman money market
turmoil and monetary policy loosening typically had the strongest upward influence on OIS ex
post excess returns.
Overall, the above results support two of the main conclusions in this paper. First, 1 to
11-month OIS contracts provide measures of investors’ interest rate expectations as good as
comparable-horizon FFFs contracts. Second, 1 to 24-month OIS contracts accurately predict
the future path of monetary policy on average; at longer horizons, OIS rates include statistically
significant ex post excess returns that reflect premia for risks in OIS contracts.
4.2 UK OIS Contracts
To assess the global usefulness of OIS rates as financial market-based measures of monetary
policy expectations, I apply the empirical specification developed for US OIS contracts to UK
OIS contracts. I calculate unconditional ex post excess returns on UK OIS contracts, from
January 2001 to December 2016, at a daily frequency. I use UK OIS rates of the following
maturities: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 18 and 24 months.30
To calculate unconditional ex post excess returns on UK OIS contracts, I make two alter-
ations to the equations laid out in section 2. First, because calculations of OIS floating leg
payments occur with no spot lag (s = 0), I calculate the floating interest rate from the trade
date to maturity. Second, because UK OIS rates are quoted according to the Actual 365 con-
vention, (3) is a multiple of 365/N , not 360/N . With daily frequency ex post excess returns
on UK OIS contracts, I estimate average ex post excess returns using (8). Table 5 presents the
results of this analysis.
Table 5 demonstrates that 2 to 18-month UK OIS contracts exhibit statistically insignificant
30The selection of maturities and sample length is, again, determined by data availability. See appendix A.
20
Table 4: Average Ex Post Excess Returns on US OIS Contracts at Daily Frequency with
Controls for 2008 Monetary Policy Loosening and 2007-2008 Money Market Turmoil
Maturity in Months 1 2 3 4 5
α̂OISn 0.23 0.33 0.46 0.63 0.94
[t-statistic] [0.88] [0.85] [0.87] [0.77] [0.75]
Initial Mon. Market Dummy 7.90 17.17*** 24.18*** 29.90*** 34.04**
[t-statistic] [1.59] [3.04] [3.07] [2.39] [2.17]
Mon. Pol. Loosening Dummy 0.18 3.56 7.86 13.27** 18.56***
[t-statistic] [0.05] [0.57] [0.92] [1.97] [2.91]
Post-Lehman Dummy 35.95*** 45.16*** 51.46*** 54.49*** 55.02***
[t-statistic] [3.49] [−6.43] [−4.42] [−7.93] [5.23]
Maturity in Months 6 7a 8a 9 10a
α̂OISn 1.42 1.28 1.67 3.34 2.58
[t-statistic] [0.76] [0.56] [0.52] [0.71] [0.50]
Initial Mon. Market Dummy 34.10** 31.67* 25.77 18.41 14.85
[t-statistic] [2.11] [1.84] [1.52] [1.30] [1.28]
Mon. Pol. Loosening Dummy 29.24** 42.40** 56.31*** 65.17*** 71.62***
[t-statistic] [2.10] [2.31] [2.77] [3.37] [3.95]
Post-Lehman Dummy 49.66*** 44.17*** 38.10*** 39.91*** 45.16***
[t-statistic] [3.97] [3.35] [2.71] [3.54] [14.65]
Maturity in Months 11a 12 15 18 21
α̂OISn 3.10 5.96 7.91 11.64 16.51
[t-statistic] [0.49] [0.70] [0.61] [0.72] [0.95]
Initial Mon. Market Dummy 12.59 8.29 8.95 −0.74 −24.42
[t-statistic] [1.33] [1.37] [−0.91] [0.05] [1.08]
Mon. Pol. Loosening Dummy 73.81*** 75.83*** 56.85*** 48.59*** 63.23***
[t-statistic] [5.56] [16.69] [10.23] [13.00] [−6.35]
Post-Lehman Dummy 52.97*** 58.62*** 98.33*** 125.43*** 134.73***
[t-statistic] [−4.17] [−3.97] [8.67] [6.63] [9.28]
Maturity in Months 24 36b 48b 60b
α̂OISn 22.31 47.23*** 90.77*** 165.10***
[t-statistic] [1.44] [3.10] [4.95] [25.57]
Initial Mon. Market Dummy −45.19* −108.98***−129.48***−144.30***
[t-statistic] [1.70] [6.24] [−7.75] [−8.15]
Mon. Pol. Loosening Dummy 70.49*** 27.00 −4.38 −33.59***
[t-statistic] [−8.18] [−1.34] [0.52] [−3.89]
Post-Lehman Dummy 145.22*** 230.61*** 231.30*** 201.68***
[t-statistic] [11.17] [11.76] [14.18] [32.61]
Note: Results from regression (8) for daily frequency US OIS contracts. Sample: Daily Frequency, January
1, 2002 to December 31, 2016, but for those indicated by a May 7, 2002 to December 31, 2016 and b
February 14, 2002 to December 31, 2016 (due to OIS rate availability). Hodrick (1992) t-statistics are
reported in square brackets. An excess return is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10%
significance level when the absolute value of the t-statistic exceeds 2.33, 1.96, 1.645 respectively. These are
denoted with asterisks ***, ** and * for the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. All figures
are reported in basis points to two decimal places. The ‘Initial Mon. Market Dummy’ is set equal to unity
on dates where the OIS contract horizon overlaps with the August 9, 2007 to January 21, 2008 money
market turmoil. The ‘Mon. Pol. Loosening Dummy’ is set equal to unity on dates where the OIS contract
horizon overlaps with the January 22, 2008 to September 14, 2008 US monetary policy loosening. The
‘Post-Lehman Dummy’ is set equal to unity on dates where the OIS contract horizon overlaps with the
September 15, 2008 to December 16, 2008 money market turmoil and monetary policy loosening following
the failure of Lehman Brothers.
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Table 5: Average Ex Post Excess Returns on UK OIS Contracts at Daily Frequency
Maturity in Months 1 2 3 4 5
α̂OISn −2.72*** −1.61 −0.32 1.14 2.73
[t-statistic] [−3.33] [−0.99] [−0.12] [0.31] [0.59]
Maturity in Months 6 7 8 9 10
α̂OISn 4.46 6.44 8.46 10.61 12.91
[t-statistic] [0.78] [0.93] [1.02] [1.09] [1.16]
Maturity in Months 11 12 18 24
α̂OISn 15.37 17.77 30.72 47.15*
[t-statistic] [1.22] [1.27] [1.48] [1.77]
Note: Results from regression (8) for UK OIS contracts. Sample: January 1, 2001 to December 31,
2016, Daily Frequency. Hodrick (1992) t-statistics are reported in square brackets. An excess return
is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level when the absolute value
of the t-statistic exceeds 2.33, 1.96, 1.645 respectively. These are denoted with asterisks ***, ** and
* for the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. All figures are reported in basis points
to two decimal places.
average ex post excess returns for the whole sample period. Although the average ex post excess
return on the 1-month contract is significant at the 1% level, it is small in magnitude at −2.72
basis points. Thus, 1 to 18-month UK OIS rates appear to provide accurate measures of interest
rate expectations on average. As in the US market, the average ex post excess return on the
2-year UK OIS contract, of 47.15 basis points, is statistically significant (at the 10% level) for
the whole 2001-2016 period.
Accounting for UK Monetary Policy Loosening Figure 6 plots the time series of un-
conditional ex post excess returns on 1 and 3-month UK OIS contracts. There is a notable
spike in both in late-2008, when UK monetary policy was being loosened in response to the
financial crisis.31 I investigate the significant ex post excess returns on 1-month and 2-year OIS
contracts in table 5 by conducting sensitivity analysis to account for the possibility that the ex
ante unanticipated UK monetary policy accommodation in response to the 2007-2008 financial
crisis biases estimates of average ex post excess returns. I regress the unconditional ex post
excess returns on UK OIS contracts on a constant and a monetary policy loosening dummy
variable, set equal to unity on dates where the OIS contract horizon overlaps with the period
spanning December 6, 2007 to March 5, 2009.32 These dates are chosen, as following the onset
of financial market turmoil in the summer 2007, the Bank of England cut Bank Rate from 5.75%
to 0.5% between December 6, 2007 to March 5, 2009. I do not include a dummy variable to
separately account for the potential effects of money market turmoil for two reasons. First, the
relationship between SONIA and Bank Rate was not significantly different during the money
31The ex post excess returns in figure 6 are also highly volatile from 2001 to mid-2004, a consequence of UK
money market operating procedures at the time. I study this in subsequent robustness analysis.
32That is, for the 1-month OIS contract, the dummy is set to 1 on days between November 6, 2007 and March
5, 2009 (inclusive) and zero otherwise.
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Figure 6: Unconditional Ex Post Excess Returns on UK Overnight Indexed Swaps
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Note: Time series of unconditional ex post excess returns for UK OIS rates calculated using equation (4). Sample:
January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2016; daily frequency. The horizontal axis of each plot denotes the date of the
ex post excess return and is labelled MM/YY.
market turmoil relative to the months prior to it.33 Second, figure 6 shows that there is no
notable spike in unconditional ex post excess returns on UK OIS contracts around initial money
market turmoil in summer 2007, in contrast to the US excess returns in figure 4, indicating that
UK money market conditions did not appreciably influence the variable of interest at this time.
Table 6 presents the regression results. The estimated αOISn coefficient can be interpreted
as the average ex post excess return on an n-month OIS contract in periods for which the
contract’s horizon did not overlap with UK monetary policy loosening. In comparison to table
5, the results in table 6 indicate that fewer OIS tenors have statistically insignificant ex post
excess returns. The estimated αOISn coefficients for the 1 to 3-month contracts are negative
and statistically significant, like the 1-month contract coefficient in table 5. Although the
estimates are quantitatively small — less than 3.25 basis points in absolute value — they indicate
that these OIS tenors may not have provided the most accurate measures of UK interest rate
expectations outside the 2007-2009 period. Moreover, while the estimated αOISn coefficient for
the 24-month contract is almost half its value in table 5, it remains significant at the 10% level.
Accounting for UK Money Market Reform One potential explanation for the significant
ex post excess returns at the 1 to 3 and 24-month horizons in table 6 relates to differences
between the OIS reference rate and the headline policy rate (Shareef, 2013). In the UK, open
33The average difference between SONIA and the UK Bank Rate prior to the money market turmoil was 0.053
percent points. This figure is calculated using daily data from January 2, 2007 to August 8, 2007, excluding
a one-day spike on June 29 (N = 152 observations), with a standard deviation on 0.039 percent points. The
corresponding figure for the initial period of money market turmoil was 0.075 percent points. This figure is
calculated using daily data from August 9, 2007 to December 5, 2007 (N = 84 observations), with standard
deviation of 0.126 percent points. The corresponding t-statistic from a difference-in-mean hypothesis test is
−1.6, implying the difference is statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, when the regression is estimated with
an additional money market turmoil dummy (set equal to unity when contracts mature between August 9, 2007
and December 5, 2007), α̂OISn coefficients remain significant at the 1% level for 1 to 3-month contracts, while the
24-month coefficient is significant at 1% level. All other α̂OISn coefficients remain statistically insignificant.
23
Table 6: Average Ex Post Excess Returns on UK OIS Contracts at Daily Frequency with
Controls for UK Monetary Policy Loosening
Maturity in Months 1 2 3 4 5
α̂OISn −3.24*** −2.94*** −2.55*** −2.15 −1.71
[t-statistic] [−5.30] [−3.61] [−2.54] [−1.64] [−0.93]
Mon. Pol. Loosening Dummy 6.28 14.78 23.39 32.27 41.22
[t-statistic] [0.95] [1.06] [1.15] [1.34] [1.62]
Maturity in Months 6 7 8 9 10
α̂OISn −1.12 −0.34 0.51 1.52 2.65
[t-statistic] [−0.44] [−0.10] [0.12] [0.30] [0.45]
Mon. Pol. Loosening Dummy 49.25* 56.51** 63.03*** 68.47*** 74.04***
[t-statistic] [1.92] [2.20] [2.38] [2.45] [2.65]
Maturity in Months 11 12 18 24
α̂OISn 3.91 5.35 13.15 25.26*
[t-statistic] [0.57] [0.71] [1.15] [1.71]
Mon. Pol. Loosening Dummy 79.27*** 82.62*** 92.30*** 94.59***
[t-statistic] [3.02] [3.31] [−3.71] [−2.37]
Note: Results from regression (8) for daily frequency UK OIS contracts. Hodrick (1992) t-statistics are
reported in square brackets. An excess return is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10%
significance level when the absolute value of the t-statistic exceeds 2.33, 1.96, 1.645 respectively. These
are denoted with asterisks ***, ** and * for the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. All
figures are reported in basis points to two decimal places. Sample: January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2016;
daily frequency; the ‘Mon. Pol. Loosening Dummy’ is set equal to unity on dates where the OIS contract
horizon overlaps with the December 6, 2007 to March 5, 2009 UK monetary policy loosening.
market operations are used to try and minimise the difference between Bank Rate, the policy
rate, and SONIA, the OIS reference rate. Figure 7 plots this difference. It illustrates that, from
2001 to mid-2004, differences were extremely large, peaking at almost 1.5 percentage points
in late-2002. The largest absolute difference between the effective federal funds rate and the
federal funds target rate in the 2002-2016 period was less than a third of this (figure 5). Bank of
England (2004) acknowledge that, during this period, sterling overnight rates were considerably
more volatile than for other countries. Figure 6 demonstrates that ex post excess returns on OIS
contracts were also highly volatile at this time, mirroring movements in figure 7. The differences
between SONIA and Bank Rate were narrowed by two changes to the Bank of England’s money
market operations on July 22, 2004,34 and May 17, 2006.35
To assess the extent to which volatility of overnight rates between 2001 and July 2004 can
explain the significant ex post excess returns on 1 to 3 and 24-month OIS contracts, I regress the
unconditional ex post excess returns on UK OIS contracts on a constant, the monetary policy
loosening dummy used in table 6, and a money market volatility dummy. The money market
volatility dummy is set equal to unity on dates where the OIS contract overlaps with the period
spanning January 1, 2001 to July 22, 2004, the date of initial UK money market reform. This
reform substantially reduced the volatility of UK overnight rates.
34See: www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/news/2004/082.pdf.
35See: www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/news/2006/055.pdf.
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Figure 7: SONIA Minus UK Bank Rate
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Note: This figure depicts the difference between the SONIA and the UK Bank Rate at a daily frequency from
January 2001 to December 2016. The left-hand dark grey area denotes the first period of money market turbulence
in 2007 — August 9 to December 5, 2007. The right-hand light grey area denotes the period of monetary policy
loosening — December 6, 2007 to March 5, 2009. Data Source: Bank of England.
The results are presented in panel A of table 7. Money market volatility from 2001 to 2004
does help to explain the significance of the 24-month tenor in tables 5 and 6. In panel A of
table 7, the average ex post excess return on the 24-month contract is statistically insignificant
at 21.47 basis points. However, the money market volatility dummy does not reverse the
significance of the short-horizon excess returns. Although quantitatively small, the average ex
post excess returns on the 1 to 5-month contracts, outside of the periods covered by the two
dummy variables, are significantly negative.
Panel B of table 7 assesses whether the significantly negative ex post excess returns on short-
horizon contracts have changed over time. Here, I estimate the unconditional average ex post
excess return on 1 to 5-month contracts for the post-2008 period only, beginning the sample
on April 1, 2009. Although the 1 to 3-month α̂OISn estimates are significant at the 1% level,
they are quantitatively small. Average ex post excess returns on 1 to 5-month contracts are
less than 1.20 basis points in magnitude, around a third of their size in panel A of table 7. The
25
Table 7: Average Ex Post Excess Returns on UK OIS Contracts at Daily Frequency with
Controls for UK Monetary Policy Loosening and UK Money Market Volatility
Panel A: UK OIS Contracts with Two Dummy Variables
Maturity in Months 1 2 3 4 5
α̂OISn −3.29*** −3.44*** −3.40*** −3.34*** −3.30*
[t-statistic] [−6.00] [−4.39] [−3.44] [−2.58] [−1.93]
Mon. Mkt. Volatility Dummy 0.17 2.05 3.42 4.74 6.31
[t-statistic] [0.09] [0.88] [1.30] [1.49] [1.36]
Mon. Pol. Loosening Dummy 6.32 15.28 24.23 33.45 42.81*
[t-statistic] [0.96] [1.10] [1.19] [1.39] [1.68]
Maturity in Months 6 7 8 9 10
α̂OISn −3.13 −2.80 −2.47 −1.96 −1.40
[t-statistic] [−1.39] [−0.97] [−0.70] [−0.47] [−0.28]
Mon. Mkt. Volatility Dummy 7.81 9.51 11.37 13.16 15.12
[t-statistic] [1.13] [1.02] [0.96] [0.94] [0.94]
Mon. Pol. Loosening Dummy 51.25** 58.96** 66.00*** 71.96*** 78.09***
[t-statistic] [2.01] [2.32] [2.54] [2.64] [2.90]
Maturity in Months 11 12 18 24
α̂OISn −0.67 0.41 7.71 21.47
[t-statistic] [−0.12] [0.06] [0.64] [1.42]
Mon. Mkt. Volatility Dummy 16.90 17.91 18.17 11.62
[t-statistic] [0.94] [0.91] [1.03] [−0.69]
Mon. Pol. Loosening Dummy 83.85*** 87.57*** 97.75*** 98.39***
[t-statistic] [3.41] [3.89] [−3.10] [−2.27]
Panel B: UK Short-Horizon OIS Contracts with Post-2008 Sample
Maturity in Months 1 2 3 4 5
α̂OISn −1.08*** −1.20*** −1.14*** −0.91 −0.52
[t-statistic] [−7.03] [−3.87] [−2.33] [−1.39] [−0.62]
Note: Results from regression (8) for daily frequency UK OIS contracts. Hodrick (1992) t-statistics are
reported in square brackets. An excess return is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10%
significance level when the absolute value of the t-statistic exceeds 2.33, 1.96, 1.645 respectively. These are
denoted with asterisks ***, ** and * for the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. All figures are
reported in basis points to two decimal places. Panel A: January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2016 sample;
daily frequency; the ‘Mon. Pol. Loosening Dummy’ is set equal to unity on dates where the OIS contract
horizon overlaps with the December 6, 2007 to March 5, 2009; ‘Mon. Mkt. Volatility Dummy’ is set equal
to unity on dates where OIS contract horizon overlaps with January 1, 2001 to July 22, 2004. Panel B:
April 1, 2009 to December 31, 2016 sample; daily frequency.
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fact these excess returns are smaller in magnitude in this period is consistent with a reduction
in UK money market volatility and a narrowing of the spread between SONIA and Bank Rate
following changes to sterling money market operating procedures in March 2009 (Jackson and
Sim, 2013; Osborne, 2016). Thus, the results indicate that the accuracy of very short-horizon
contracts as measures of UK interest rate expectations have improved since the financial crisis.
This is further supported in figure 6, where excess returns are visibly close to, but slightly below,
zero for most of the period after the financial crisis, following sizeable spikes in late-2008.
4.3 Eurozone OIS Contracts
EONIA is the overnight floating reference rate used to calculate unconditional ex post excess
returns on Eurozone OIS contracts. As per market convention, the contracts have a two-day
spot lag and obey the Actual 360 dating norm. I use Eurozone OIS rates, between January
2000 and December 2016, of the following maturities: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 18,
24 and 36 months.36
Table 8 presents the estimated average ex post excess returns on Eurozone OIS contracts for
the whole 2000-2016 sample. These unconditional average ex post returns are significant at all
horizons, at the 10% level at least. Although the average ex post excess returns at short-term
horizons are small — the 1-month estimate is just 1.12 basis points — there is no distinction in
the significance of short and long-term horizon tenors. At first sight, these findings challenge the
claim that 1 to 24-month Eurozone OIS rates provide useful measures of investors’ expectations
of future short-term interest rates. However, this average result for the whole 2000-2016 sample
masks variation within the period.
Accounting for Eurozone Money Market Developments from August 2007 To inves-
tigate these results, I conduct sensitivity analysis to assess whether developments in Eurozone
money markets and European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy from 2007 onwards might
bias the average ex post excess returns reported in table 8.
Eurozone money markets were immediately affected by the August 2007 money market tur-
moil.37 Like the Federal Reserve, the ECB responded by injecting liquidity to money markets
to preserve their proper functioning, which served to reduce the level of EONIA without adjust-
ing the ECB’s main refinancing (refi) rate.38 On October 15, 2008, the ECB began to loosen
monetary policy, reducing the refi rate from 4.25% to 3.75%. By May 13, 2009, the ECB refi
rate had reached 1%.
However, as a result of ECB liquidity operations, EONIA fell persistently below the refi
rate from October 2008 onwards, as shown in figure 8. Between June 2009 and April 2011,
the ECB’s key interest rates (the refi rate, and the interest rates on the deposit and marginal
36The selection of maturities and tenor-specific sample periods are, again, determined by data availability —
see appendix A.
37The difference between EONIA and the ECB’s main refinancing (refi) rate increased from 9 basis points on
August 8, 2007 to 22 basis points on August 9, 2007.
38By August 28, 2007, EONIA was 28 basis points below the refi rate.
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Table 8: Average Ex Post Excess Returns on Eurozone OIS Contracts at Daily Frequency
Maturity in Months 1 2 3 4 5
α̂OISn 1.12*** 2.24*** 3.51** 4.98** 6.61**
[t-statistic] [2.48] [2.55] [2.17] [2.06] [2.02]
Maturity in Months 6 7 8 9 10
α̂OISn 8.44** 10.36** 12.41** 14.57** 16.84**
[t-statistic] [2.01] [2.00] [2.00] [1.99] [1.98]
Maturity in Months 11 12 15a 18 21a
α̂OISn 19.19** 21.64* 28.17** 35.29** 43.15***
[t-statistic] [1.98] [1.99] [2.05] [2.23] [2.48]
Maturity in Months 24 36b
α̂OISn 51.26*** 80.08***
[t-statistic] [2.83] [5.00]
Note: Results from regression (8) for Eurozone OIS contracts. Sample: Daily Frequency, January 3,
2000 to December 31, 2016, but for those indicated by a August 22, 2001 to December 31, 2016 and
b March 3, 2004 to December 31, 2016 (due to OIS rate availability). Hodrick (1992) t-statistics
are reported in square brackets. An excess return is significantly different from zero at the 1%,
5% and 10% significance level when the absolute value of the t-statistic exceeds 2.33, 1.96, 1.645
respectively. These are denoted with asterisks ***, ** and * for the 1%, 5% and 10% significance
levels respectively. All figures are reported in basis points to two decimal places.
lending facilities) were unchanged. EONIA was well below the refi rate during this period,
closer to the ECB’s standing deposit facility rate, indicating that the effective monetary policy
stance was much looser than suggested by the main policy rate. Geraats (2011) labels this a
period of ‘monetary policy by stealth’. Although the ECB increased its refi rate twice in 2011,
before reducing it five times between November 2011 and November 2013, EONIA continued to
remain significantly below the headline policy rate. During this period the difference between
the refi and deposit rates reduced from 75 basis points to 25 basis points, and the gap between
EONIA and the refi rate narrowed, but widened again following cuts in the ECB deposit rate
and an expanded asset purchase programme which was announced on January 22, 2015 and
began on March 9, 2015. Because these developments significantly influenced the reference rate
on Eurozone OIS contracts, I account for these periods in sensitivity analysis.
Table 9 provides summary statistics for the differences between EONIA and the refi rate in
five sub-samples from 2007 onwards. Prior to the money market turmoil — between January
2, 2007 and August 8, 2007 — EONIA was, on average, 5.8 basis points above the refi rate.
During the period of money market turmoil — between August 9, 2007 and October 14, 2008 —
the spread fell to 0.4 basis points on average, following ECB liquidity interventions that sought
to stabilise EONIA around the refi rate. However, the spread was over twice as volatile.
From October 15, 2008, the ECB began to cut its refi rate, while also providing unlimited
liquidity on demand through a fixed-tender procedure with full allotment at the refi rate. Be-
tween October 15, 2008 and June 24, 2009, EONIA was, on average, 40.8 basis points below
the refi rate; the standard deviation of the difference was almost twice that in the period of
initial money market turmoil. On June 24, 2009, the ECB initiated one-year longer-term refi-
28
Figure 8: Eurozone Money Market Turmoil
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Note: This figure depicts the ECB’s refi, deposit and lending rates, and EONIA at a daily frequency from
January 2, 2007 to December 31, 2016. The refi rate refers to the minimum bid or fixed rate for ECB main
refinancing operations. The deposit rate refers to the rate on the ECB’s deposit facility, which banks may use
to make overnight deposits with the Eurosystem. The lending rate refers to the rate on the ECB’s marginal
lending facility, which offers overnight credit to banks from the Eurosystem. Area I denotes the initial period of
money market turbulence, beginning on August 9, 2007 and ending on October 14, 2008. Area II represents the
period of monetary policy loosening between October 15, 2008 and June 24, 2009. Area III denotes the period
in which EONIA remained persistently below the refi rate, from June 25, 2009 to November 12, 2013. Area IV
is an intermediate period between November 13, 2013 and March 8, 2015. Area V denotes the period in which
EONIA remained persistently below the refi rate during the ECB’s quantitative easing operations, from March
9, 2015 and December 31, 2016. Data Source: European Central Bank.
nancing operations. From June 25, 2009 to November 12, 2013, EONIA was, on average, 54.2
basis points below the refi rate, marking the first period of monetary policy by stealth. On
November 13, 2013, the ECB’s refi rate was cut by 25 basis points to 25 basis points. Between
this date and March 8, 2015, the difference between EONIA and the ECB refi rate diminished
— over the period, the average difference was just −7.6 basis points and the standard deviation
of this difference was more comparable to that seen prior to the initial money market turmoil.
However, when the ECB enacted its expanded asset purchase programme on March 9, 2015,
EONIA fell further below the refi rate. Between March 9, 2015 and December 31, 2016, EONIA
was, on average, 25.9 basis points below the refi rate.
Because the difference between EONIA and the refi rate differs across sub-samples, I account
for these five distinct periods in the sensitivity analysis indicated in figure 8 and table 9: (i) the
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Table 9: Eurozone Money Market Turmoil: The Difference Between EONIA and the ECB Refi
Rate in Percent Points
Dates Mean Standard
Deviation
# Obs.
Pre-Turmoil (02/01/2007-08/08/2007) 0.058 0.063 154
I: Money Market Turmoil (09/08/2007-14/10/2008) 0.004 0.137 303
II: Monetary Policy Loosening (15/10/2008-24/06/2009) -0.408 0.246 175
III: Monetary Policy By Stealth I (25/06/2009-12/11/2013) -0.542 0.178 1128
IV: Intermediate Period (13/11/2013-08/03/2015) -0.076 0.072 334
V: Monetary Policy By Stealth II (09/03/2015-31/12/2016) -0.259 0.086 467
Note: Average difference between EONIA and the ECB refi rate in percent points using daily frequency
data. The ECB refi rate is the minimum bid or fixed rate for main refinancing operations. The final column,
“# Obs.” denotes the number of observations in each sub-sample. Data Source: European Central Bank.
initial money market turmoil beginning on August 9, 2016; (ii) the period of Eurozone monetary
policy loosening, beginning on October 15, 2008; (iii) the initial period of monetary policy by
stealth, beginning on June 25, 2009; (iv) the intermediate period, beginning on November 13,
2013; and (v) the second period of monetary policy by stealth, beginning on March 9, 2015
and running to the end of the sample. To do this, I augment the baseline regression with five
dummy variables. As before, the dummy variables are set to unity on dates where the OIS
contract horizon overlaps with the relevant period.
Table 10 presents the results of the augmented regression, where the estimated αOISn co-
efficients can be interpreted as the average ex post excess returns on Eurozone OIS contracts
between January 3, 2000 and August 8, 2007.39 The estimated dummy variable coefficients
represent the increase in average ex post excess returns associated with the specific periods they
pertain to. Importantly, the estimated αOISn coefficients are insignificantly different from zero
for the 1 to 3 and 7 to 24-month tenors, implying that these OIS contracts provide accurate
information about investors’ expectations of future short-term interest rates. Although the 4 to
6-month coefficients are statistically significant, they are small, ranging from just 1.56 to 3.79
basis points.
The estimated dummy variable coefficients indicate that ECB monetary policy loosening
between October 15, 2008 and June 6, 2009 had the largest positive impact on ex post excess
returns. The estimated coefficients on this dummy variable are significantly positive at the
10% level, at least, for all tenors. This finding reflects the ex ante unexpected nature of the
post-financial crisis monetary policy loosening, rather than risk premia within OIS contracts
that undermine their use as measures of monetary policy expectations.
Interestingly, the coefficient on the first monetary policy by stealth dummy is significantly
positive, at the 5% level at least, for the 1 to 3-month tenors. This indicates that the discrepancy
between EONIA and the ECB’s refi rate that arose in these periods did have implications for the
information contained in OIS rates, and their use as a measure of monetary policy expectations.
39Because of the definition of the dummy variables, and the limited availability of 36-month Eurozone OIS rate
data, I do not present estimates for this tenor in table 10.
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Table 10: Average Ex Post Excess Returns on Eurozone OIS Contracts at Daily Frequency
with Controls for Money Market Turmoil, Monetary Policy Loosening and Stealth
Maturity in Months 1 2 3 4 5 6
α̂OISn −0.14 0.12 0.64 1.56* 2.63** 3.79*
[t-statistic] [−0.25] [0.19] [1.28] [1.91] [2.07] [1.82]
Mon. Market Dummy 3.11* 4.69 5.63 6.20 6.51 6.82
[t-statistic] [1.66] [1.49] [1.29] [1.01] [0.95] [0.93]
Mon. Pol. Dummy 6.24* 17.19** 27.61*** 37.64*** 46.02*** 52.79***
[t-statistic] [1.76] [2.25] [2.66] [3.95] [8.52] [−7.99]
Policy by Stealth I Dummy 2.31** 2.62*** 2.36*** 1.51 0.70 0.43
[t-statistic] [1.98] [3.20] [2.39] [0.71] [0.19] [0.09]
Intermediate Dummy −0.33 −0.66 −1.09 −1.47 −1.89 −2.58
[t-statistic] [−0.40] [−0.53] [−0.66] [−0.80] [−0.96] [−1.05]
Policy by Stealth II Dummy 0.05 −0.35 −0.66 −1.29 −1.93 −2.55
[t-statistic] [0.10] [−0.54] [−0.96] [−1.18] [−1.35] [−1.29]
Maturity in Months 7 8 9 10 11 12
α̂OISn 4.83 5.52 5.51 4.64 4.24 3.89
[t-statistic] [1.52] [1.25] [0.94] [0.58] [0.41] [0.29]
Mon. Market Dummy 7.50 9.07 11.17 13.41 14.85 15.45
[t-statistic] [0.90] [0.91] [0.87] [0.79] [0.72] [0.66]
Mon. Pol. Dummy 58.09*** 61.19*** 61.86*** 64.09*** 65.41*** 66.55***
[t-statistic] [−5.86] [−5.14] [−4.23] [−4.22] [−4.04] [−4.04]
Policy by Stealth I Dummy 0.70 2.22 6.01 11.41 16.34 21.62
[t-statistic] [0.12] [0.35] [0.91] [1.23] [1.28] [1.27]
Intermediate Dummy −3.37 −4.39 −5.89* −7.63*** −10.68*** −14.53***
[t-statistic] [−1.15] [−1.37] [−1.83] [−2.99] [−4.18] [−3.91]
Policy by Stealth II Dummy −2.62 −1.90 −0.27 2.61 6.29 10.48
[t-statistic] [−0.91] [−0.47] [−0.05] [0.36] [0.63] [0.79]
Maturity in Months 15a 18 21a 24
α̂OISn 4.20 10.85 18.06 26.66
[t-statistic] [0.20] [0.43] [0.63] [0.88]
Mon. Market Dummy 9.47 −5.73 −20.14 −38.15
[t-statistic] [0.34] [−0.20] [−0.63] [−1.01]
Mon. Pol. Dummy 73.62*** 87.67*** 94.43*** 98.84***
[t-statistic] [−9.54] [4.42] [3.30] [3.12]
Policy by Stealth I Dummy 33.71 35.05 40.23 47.12
[t-statistic] [1.32] [1.36] [1.48] [1.51]
Intermediate Dummy −27.19*** −36.06*** −48.18*** −58.59***
[t-statistic] [−2.63] [−3.50] [−12.75] [−7.33]
Policy by Stealth II Dummy 23.43 26.50 33.33 32.00*
[t-statistic] [1.00] [1.07] [1.58] [1.68]
Note: Results from regression (8) for Eurozone OIS contracts. Sample: Daily Frequency, Jan. 3, 2000 to Dec. 31,
2016, but for those indicated by a Aug. 22, 2001 to Dec. 31, 2016. Hodrick (1992) t-statistics in square brackets.
1%, 5% and 10% significance denoted by ***, * and *, respectively. All figures in basis points to two decimal
places. ‘Mon. Market Dummy’: equal to 1 on dates where the OIS contract horizon overlaps with the Aug. 9, 2007
to Oct. 14, 2008 money market turmoil. ‘Mon. Pol. Dummy’: equal to 1 on dates where the OIS contract horizon
overlaps with the Oct. 15, 2008 to Jun. 24, 2009 ECB monetary policy loosening. ‘Policy by Stealth I Dummy’
(‘Intermediate Dummy’): equal to 1 on dates where the OIS contract horizon overlaps with the Jun. 25, 2009 to
Nov. 12, 2013 (Nov. 13, 2013 to Mar. 8, 2015) period. ‘Policy by Stealth II Dummy’: equal to 1 on dates where
the OIS contract horizon overlaps with Mar. 9, 2015 to Dec. 31, 2016.
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Overall, although events in the Eurozone call for a more nuanced study of ex post excess
returns on OIS contracts, the above results indicate that, on average, 1 to 24-month tenors
provide accurate measures of investors’ interest rate expectations.
4.4 Japanese OIS Contracts
To calculate unconditional ex post excess returns on Japanese OIS contracts, I use TONAR as
the overnight floating reference rate. The contracts have a two day spot lag and obey the Actual
365 dating convention. I use Japanese OIS rates, between July 2003 and December 2016, of
the following maturities: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 18 and 24 months. 40
Table 11 presents the estimated average ex post excess returns on Japanese OIS contracts.
The most striking finding is that average ex post excess returns on Japanese contracts are much
smaller quantitatively than those on US, UK and Eurozone contracts. This is, most likely, due
to the smaller degree of variation in the Japanese policy rate during the 2003-2016 period, with
Japanese policy bound by the ELB for most of this epoch. Average ex post excess returns are
insignificantly different from zero for all maturities from 1 months to 2 years; these contracts
accurately reflect investors’ expectations of future short-term interest rates.
Table 11: Average Ex Post Excess Returns on Japanese OIS Contracts at Daily Frequency
Panel A: Japan OIS Contracts
Maturity in Months 1 2 3 4 5
α̂OISn −0.00 0.19 0.40 0.64 0.86
[t-statistic] [−0.00] [0.59] [0.80] [0.97] [1.13]
Maturity in Months 6 9 12 18a 24a
α̂OISn 1.28 2.61 4.12 8.04 12.94
[t-statistic] [1.47] [1.57] [1.52] [1.41] [1.52]
Note: Results from regression (8) for Japanese OIS contracts. Sample: Daily Frequency, July 24,
2003 to December 31, 2016, but for those indicated by a December 7, 2005 to December 31, 2016
(due to OIS rate availability). Hodrick (1992) t-statistics are reported in square brackets. An excess
return is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level when the absolute
value of the t-statistic exceeds 2.33, 1.96, 1.645 respectively. These are denoted with asterisks ***,
** and * for the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. All figures are reported in basis
points to two decimal places.
5 Conclusion
Three main results emerge from this paper. First, and most importantly, 1 to 24-month US OIS
rates, on average, provide accurate measures of investors’ short-term interest rate expectations,
an indicator of the de facto monetary policy stance. Average ex post excess returns on the
majority of these contracts are insignificantly different from zero, and any significant results
can be explained by unanticipated monetary policy loosening and money market turmoil in
40The selection of maturities and horizon-specific sample periods are, again, determined by data availability.
See appendix A.
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2007-2008. These findings suggest that US OIS rates can be used as empirical measures of
investors’ expectations of future short-term interest rates out to 2 years in advance. Moreover,
this result supports the joint use of US OIS rates and the term structure of government bond
yields to estimate longer-horizon monetary policy expectations (Lloyd, 2017a).
Second, 1 to 11-month US OIS contracts provide measures of investors’ interest rate ex-
pectations that are as good as those from comparable-horizon FFFs contracts. Excess returns
on these OIS contracts are quantitatively similar to those on comparable-horizon portfolios of
FFFs contacts.
Third, much of the accuracy of US OIS rates as financial market-based measures of future
short-term interest rate expectations carries over to UK, Eurozone and Japanese OIS markets.
OIS contracts with maturities of up to 2 years in the UK, Eurozone and Japanese OIS rates
provide accurate measures of investors’ interest rate expectations, with some exceptions for very
short-maturity UK OIS contracts during the first half of the 2000s.
This has important implications for the understanding of monetary policy shocks on a global
scale. To date, many methods used by monetary economists rely on FFF data to measure
expectations of the future monetary policy stance (e.g. Gu¨rkaynak et al., 2005a; Gertler and
Karadi, 2015). This has limited the application of these methods to US data only. Motivated
by the results in this paper, researchers can look to OIS rates as a globally-comparable measure
of monetary policy expectations that enables them to apply these methods to a wider set of
countries. These results should serve as a useful reference for, inter alia, a developing literature
on the global effects of domestic monetary policy shocks (e.g. Rey, 2016).
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Appendix
A Data Sources
Data Series Source
- US OIS Rates Bloomberg, with codes: USSOA 1 month; USSOB 2 months; ...;
USSOK 11 months; USSO1 12 months; USSO1C 15 months; USSO1F 18
months; USSO1I 21 months; USSO2 2 years; USSO3 3 years; USSO4
4 years; and USSO5 5 years.
- US Federal Funds
Futures
Bloomberg with codes: FF1 which settles based on current calendar
month, FF2 which settles based on the subsequent calendar month,
..., FF12 which settles based on the 11th calendar month ahead,
and www.quandl.com/data/OFDP/FUTURE FFX where X should be
replaced by the horizon of the contract in months (X= 1, 2, ..., 11).
- US Effective Fed-
eral Funds Rate
Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15: www.federalreserve.
gov/releases/h15/data.htm.
- UK OIS Rates Bloomberg, with codes: BPSWSA 1 month; BPSWSB 2 months;
...; BPSWSK 11 months; BPSWS1 12 months; BPSWS1C 15 months;
BPSWS1F 18 months; BPSWS1I 21 months; BPSWS2 2 years; BPSWS3
3 years; BPSWS4 4 years; and BPSWS5 5 years.
- UK SONIA Bank of England: www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/
index.asp?first=yes&SectionRequired=I&HideNums=-1&
ExtraInfo=true&Travel=NIxIRx.
- Eurozone OIS
Rates
Bloomberg, with codes: EUSWEA 1 month; EUSWEB 2 months; ...;
EUSWEK 11 months; EUSWE1 1 year; EUSWE1C 15 months; EUSWE1F
18 months; EUSWE1I 21 months; EUSWE2 2 years; EUSWE3 3 years;
EUWE4 4 years; and EUSWE5 5 years.
- Eurozone EONIA European Central Bank: sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?
SERIES_KEY=198.EON.D.EONIA_TO.RATE.
- Japanese OIS
Rates
Bloomberg, with codes: JYSOA 1 month; JYSOB 2 months; ...; JYSOK
11 months; JYSO1 1 year; JYSO1C 15 months; JYSO1F 18 months;
JYSO1I 21 months; JYSO2 2 years; JYSO3 3 years; JYSO4 4 years;
and JYSO5 5 years.
- Japanese TONAR Bank of Japan: www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/market/short/
mutan/index.htm/.
Availability of US OIS Rate Data On Bloomberg, the availability of daily US OIS rate
data varies with the maturity of the contract. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12 and 21-month OIS rates
are available at a daily frequency from December 5, 2001. 15, 18 and 24-month OIS rates are
available at a daily frequency from December 21, 2001. 7, 8, 10 and 11-month OIS rates are
available at a daily frequency from May 7, 2002. 3, 4 and 5-year OIS rates are available from
February 14, 2002. 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22 and 23-month OIS rates are only available from
March 3, 2010 to June 14, 2011. Because of the lack of coverage at these maturities, I omit
them from this study.
Availability of UK OIS Rate Data On Bloomberg, the availability of daily UK OIS rate
data varies with the maturity of the contract. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 18 and 24-month
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OIS rates are available at a daily frequency from December 14, 2000. 15 and 21-month OIS
rates are available at a daily frequency from January 25, 2006. 3 and 4-year OIS rates are
available at a daily frequency from September 4, 2008. 5-year OIS rates are available at a daily
frequency from May 23, 2008. Because data at these latter five maturities — 15 and 21-months,
and 3, 4 and 5-years — is not available prior to 2006 and 2008 respectively, I omit them from
this study.
Availability of Eurozone OIS Rate Data Remolana and Wooldridge (2003) document
the growth of the Eurozone OIS market since the inception of the Euro in 1999 to 2003. On
Bloomberg, the availability of daily Eurozone OIS rate data varies with the maturity of the
contract. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12-month OIS rates are available at a daily
frequency from January 3, 2000, at least. 15 and 21-month OIS rates are available at a daily
frequency from August 22, 2001. Although observations for 18 and 24-month OIS rates are
available from as early as January 3, 2000, a regular daily series of observations begins on July
9, 2001 at these maturities. 3-year OIS rates are available at a daily frequency from March 3,
2004. 4 and 5-year OIS rates are available at a daily frequency from July 19, 2005 and June
13, 2005, respectively. Because data at these latter two maturities — 4 and 5-years — is not
available prior to 2005, I omit them from this study.
Availability of Japanese OIS Rate Data Baba, Nagano, and Ooka (2006) describe the
growth in Japanese OIS markets during the years preceding 2006. On Bloomberg, the availability
of daily Japanese OIS rate data varies with the maturity of the contract. Observations for 1,
2 and 3-month OIS rate data begin on March 15, 2002, but the daily series are sporadic. The
first observations for the 6, 9 and 12-month OIS contracts is March 22, 2002, but the time series
are also sporadic. Regular daily observations for the 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9 and 12-month OIS rates
are available from July 24, 2003. 7, 8, 10 and 11-month OIS rates are available from November
16, 2004. 15 and 21-month OIS rates are available from May 5, 2007. 18 and 24-month OIS
rates are available from December 7, 2005. 3-year OIS rates are regularly available at a daily
frequency from November 19, 2007. 4-and 5-year OIS rates are available from August 6, 2009.
I do not present results for the 7, 8, 10 and 11-month, and 3, 4 and 5-year OIS rates in this
study.
B Pure FFFs Contracts
To ensure that the data transformations described in section 3, used to create ‘portfolios’ of
FFFs contracts that are comparable in horizon to OIS contracts, are not driving the above
conclusions, I also estimate the average ex post excess returns on ‘pure’ FFFs contracts on the
penultimate business day of each month. That is, I estimate the following regression
rxFFFt,t+n = α
FFF
n + ε
FFF
t+n (10)
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Table 12: Unconditional Ex Post Excess Returns on FFFs Contracts
Panel A: FFFs Contracts
Maturity in Months 1 2 3 4 5 6
α̂FFFn 1.22*** 3.65** 6.52* 9.64* 12.98* 16.69*
[t-statistic] [2.39] [2.03] [1.93] [1.88] [1.82] [1.73]
Maturity in Months 7 8 9 10 11
α̂FFFn 20.98* 25.00 29.52 47.22 56.39
[t-statistic] [1.67] [1.59] [1.54] [1.64] [1.59]
Panel B: FFFs Contracts with 2008 Dummy
Maturity in Months 1 2 3 4 5 6
α̂FFFn 0.54* 1.87* 3.45* 3.64 5.72 7.04
[t-statistic] [1.82] [1.76] [1.67] [1.55] [1.34] [1.23]
2008 Dummy 9.71* 23.26 37.00 66.67*** 75.85*** 94.26***
[t-statistic] [1.77] [1.41] [1.52] [2.84] [4.35] [19.94]
Maturity in Months 7 8 9 10 11
α̂FFFn 8.79 10.23 11.68 32.37 40.25
[t-statistic] [1.19] [1.11] [1.04] [1.21] [1.17]
2008 Dummy 111.78*** 128.26*** 146.31*** 113.09*** 115.94**
[t-statistic] [35.29] [9.55] [6.81] [2.60] [2.29]
Note: Results from regression (10) for FFFs contracts. Sample: January 2002 to December 2016, Monthly
Frequency. Hodrick (1992) t-statistics are reported in square brackets. An excess return is significantly different
from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level when the absolute value of the t-statistic exceeds 2.33,
1.96, 1.645 respectively. These are denoted with asterisks ***, ** and * for the 1%, 5% and 10% significance
levels respectively. All figures are reported in basis points to two decimal places.
for untransformed FFFs rates. Table 12 presents the results from this analysis. These results
can be viewed simply as updating the results from Piazzesi and Swanson (2008), with the only
difference coming from the fact that I use FFFs rates on the penultimate business day of each
month and Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) use FFFs rates on the final day of each month.
As in table 1, the average ex post excess returns on FFFs contracts of 1 to 7 months in
maturity is found to be statistically significant at the 10% level, at least. Sensitivity analysis
suggests that this significance is predominantly driven by the unexpected monetary policy easing
associated with the 2007-2008 financial crisis, at the 4 to 11-month horizons especially.
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